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1 Introduction
The Great Moderation, the reduction in volatility (standard deviation) observed in most macro
variables since the mid-1980s, makes it difficult to explain macroeconomic dynamics in the US
over the last 40 years within a linear homoskedastic framework. There is still no consensus on
whether the Great Moderation represents a structural break or rather a persistent but temporary
change in regime. The causes also remain the subject of much debate. Was the Great Moderation
the result of a reduction in the volatility of economic shocks, or was it brought about by a change
in the propagation of shocks, for instance through a more aggressive monetary policy? Articles
in favor of the “shock explanation” include McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Sims and Zha
(2006), Liu, Waggoner, and Zha (2011); articles in favor of the policy channel include Clarida,
Galı´, and Gertler (1999) and Galı´ and Gambetti (2008). Nevertheless, there is empirical evidence
of both changes in the variance of economic shocks (Sims and Zha (2006)) and persistent changes
in monetary policy (see Cogley and Sargent (2005), Boivin (2006), and Lubik and Schorfheide
(2004)), necessitating an empirical framework that can accommodate both.
In this article, we estimate a standard New-Keynesian model accommodating regime changes
in systematic monetary policy, in the variance of discretionary monetary policy shocks and in the
variance of economic shocks. Whereas the model implies the presence of recurring regimes, it
can also produce near permanent changes in regime. With the structural model, we can revisit
the timing of the onset of the Great Moderation, and it so happens, also its demise. Moreover,
we can then trace the sources of changes in the volatility of macroeconomic outcomes to changes
in the volatility of demand, supply and discretionary monetary policy shocks, and to changes in
systematic monetary policy. We find that output and inflation shocks moved to a lower variability
regime in 1985 and 1990, respectively, but move back to the higher variability regime towards the
end of 2008. Systematic monetary policy became more active after 1980, whereas discretionary
monetary policy shocks were much less frequent after 19851. The aggressive lowering of interest
rates in the 2000-2005 period preceding the recent financial crisis is characterized as an activist
regime. Put together, we identify the 1980-2007 period as a period with substantially lower output
and inflation variability. From several perspectives, including counterfactual analysis, monetary
policy was a critical driver of the Great Moderation.
While we retain the elegance of the theoretical Rational Expectations model, we make use of
survey forecasts for inflation and GDP in the estimation. Ang, Bekaert, and Wei (2007) show
that survey expectations beat any other model in forecasting future inflation out of sample. The
use of survey forecasts not only brings additional information to bear on a complex estimation
1Throughout the article we use active or activist policy to indicate the monetary policy regime where the interest
rate reacts to expected inflation more than one to one, in contrast to passive monetary policy.
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problem, but also simplifies the identification of the regimes under certain assumptions. In the
extant literature, survey forecasts have mostly been used to provide alternative estimates of the
Phillips curve (see Roberts (1995) and Adam and Padula (2003)). Instead, we study the role of
survey expectations in shaping macroeconomic dynamics in the context of a standard NK model,
accommodating regime switches.
While current medium-scale Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models typi-
cally feature more variables and richer dynamics (see, for instance, Smets and Wouters (2007),
Del Negro (2007)), we deliberately focus on a small scale New-Keynesian model with an output
gap, inflation, and interest rate equation for several reasons. First of all, this is the first attempt to
estimate a small-scale DSGE model with survey-based expectations, which by themselves com-
prise very valuable information about a large set of variables. As a result, it is both instructive
and relevant to focus on a relatively simple benchmark which also facilitates comparing estimation
results with previous studies. Second, the model is rich enough to capture the time-varying role
of both monetary policy and the key shocks shaping the Great Moderation in terms of output and
inflation. Medium-scale models incorporating capital and labor explicitly may account for output
fluctuations better than our model, but the marginal gain for the identification of inflation dynam-
ics, monetary policy, and the Great Moderation is likely small. Third, the estimation of even a
stylized model with a realistic number of regimes remains actually very complex. Part or our con-
tribution is to embed survey forecasts in the estimation and to obtain a Markov-Switching Rational
Expectations (MSRE) Equilibrium, applying recent results in Cho (2011).
There has been recent progress in DSGE models incorporating regime-switching and time vari-
ation of structural parameters, including Bikbov and Chernov (2008) and Ferna´ndez-Villaverde,
Guerro´n-Quintana, and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2010). These articles use very different identification
strategies, and do not make use of survey expectations. Apart from our modeling differences,
which we discuss further in the model section, our analysis of the rational expectations equilibrium
in a Markov-switching New-Keynesian model extends Davig and Leeper (2007) to an empirically
more realistic setting. Our paper is closely related to Bianchi (2011), who also estimates a regime-
switching New-Keynesian model. His model is a medium-scale DSGE model which differentiates
the effects of macro shocks on consumption and investment. In his model, all macro shocks switch
simultaneously, whereas we allow shocks to switch independently. As a result, our model dis-
plays many more different regimes (16) than his (4). Because the origin of supply, demand, and
monetary policy shocks is by definition very different, we view our specification as more realistic.
As Bianchi (2011) does, we both find a stabilizing switch towards active monetary policy in the
early 80s, but in the last version of Bianchi (2011)’s article this is a once-and-for-all switch and for
our model it is not. Liu, Waggoner, and Zha (2011) also estimate a New-Keynesian model with
switches in shocks and the inflation target, but do not accommodate switches in policy response
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coefficients, which we identify as key to explain historical U.S. macro dynamics.
None of the aforementioned studies analyzes determinacy, an important characteristic of ra-
tional expectations models. For example, Lubik and Schorfheide (2004) document indeterminacy
in the pre-Volcker period and dicuss the estimation biases arising when indeterminate equilibria
are excluded. Applying a methodology developed by Cho (2011), who derives conditions for
determinacy of general MSRE models in the mean-square stability sense, we find the estimated
New-Keynesian model to be indeterminate. Davig and Leeper (2007) and Farmer, Waggoner, and
Zha (2009) have previously shown that a temporarily passive monetary policy can be admissible
as a part of a determinate equilibrium in simple calibrated MSRE models. However, in our more
complex model featuring endogenous persistence, the actual policy stance in the passive regime
for the U.S. economy during the 1968-2008 period is estimated to be excessively passive relative
to the active regime, thereby causing indeterminacy. The recent return to a passive regime also
contributed to the end of the Great Moderation. We also perform a sensitivity analysis to derive a
determinacy region for our model.
Section 2 describes the New-Keynesian model, detailing the role of regime-switching and ex-
pectations formation. Section 3 discusses the data used and describes the estimation method em-
ployed. Section 4 presents the empirical results, emphasizing the parameter estimates and the
identified regimes. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 The basic New-Keynesian model
While our methodology is more generally useful, we focus attention on the following three-
variable-three-equation New-Keynesian macro model, a benchmark of much recent monetary pol-
icy and macroeconomic analysis:
pit = δEtpit+1+(1−δ)pit−1+λyt + εpi,t , εpi,t ∼ N(0,σ2pi) (1)
yt = µEtyt+1+(1−µ)yt−1−φ(it −Etpit+1)+ εy,t , εy,t ∼ N(0,σ2y) (2)
it = ρit−1+(1−ρ)[βEtpit+1+ γyt ]+ εi,t , εi,t ,∼ N(0,σ2i ) (3)
where pit is the inflation rate, yt is the output gap and it is the nominal interest rate. Et is the
conditional expectations operator. The three equations are subject to aggregate supply (AS), ag-
gregate demand (IS) and monetary policy shocks, respectively. We denote these shocks by εpi,t
(AS-shock), εy,t (IS-shock), and εi,t (monetary policy shock). The δ and µ parameters represent
the degree of forward-looking behavior in the AS and IS equation, respectively, and if they are not
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equal to one the model features endogenous persistence. The φ parameter measures the impact of
changes in real interest rates on output and λ the effect of output on inflation. The monetary policy
reaction function is a forward-looking Taylor rule with smoothing parameter ρ. While policy rules
featuring contemporaneous rather than expected inflation are still popular (see e.g. Ferna´ndez-
Villaverde, Guerro´n-Quintana, and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2010)), it is well accepted that policy makers
consider expected measures of inflation in their policy decisions (see Bernanke (2010), Boivin and
Giannoni (2006)). Policy should not react to temporary shocks that affect the contemporaneous
rate of inflation, but not the future path of inflation.
The model is a simple example of a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) macro
model, characterized by a set of difference equations where today’s decisions are a function of
expected future macro variables as well as lags of the endogenous variables. These equations rep-
resent the log-linearized first-order conditions of the optimizing problems faced by a representative
agent, firms, and the monetary authority. In matrix form, the model can be expressed as:
AXt = BEtXt+1+DXt−1+ εt, εt ∼ N(0,Σ) (4)
where Xt is the vector of macro variables and εt is the vector of structural macro shocks. A,B, and
D are matrices of structural parameters and Σ is the diagonal variance matrix of εt . Throughout this
article, we focus on a rational expectations equilibrium (REE, henceforth) that depends only on the
minimum state variables following McCallum (1983), also referred to as a fundamental solution.
The solution to model (4) then follows a VAR(1) law of motion:
Xt = ΩXt−1+Γεt (5)
where Ω and Γ are highly non-linear functions of the structural parameters, which can be solved
following Klein (2000), Sims (2002), or Cho and Moreno (2011). We postpone discussion of the
characterization of the rational expectations equilibria to Section 2.3.
Macro Models often have a hard time fitting non-linear macro dynamics. While there are many
potential reasons for this, we focus on two. First, there is considerable evidence of parameter insta-
bility. As noted by Clarida, Galı´, and Gertler (1999), the monetary authority may have learned over
time to react more aggressively to inflation deviations from target in order to tame output and infla-
tion fluctuations, leading to instability in the systematic monetary policy parameters. In addition,
the Great Moderation literature (McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000), Cogley and Sargent (2005),
Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2007), and Sims and Zha (2006)) shows that the out-
put shocks identified in both reduced-form and structural models are heteroskedastic, displaying a
pronounced decline after the mid 1980s. As a result, econometricians have tried to accommodate
these parameter changes through subsample analysis (Clarida, Galı´, and Gertler (1999), Moreno
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(2004), and Boivin and Giannoni (2006)), time varying structural parameter and volatility esti-
mation (Kim and Nelson (2006), Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2007), Ang, Boivin,
Dong, and Loo-Kung (2010)) or through regime-switching models (Bikbov and Chernov (2008)
and Sims and Zha (2006)). We incorporate regime-switching behavior in both systematic monetary
policy and the variances of the structural shocks. The other parameters are assumed time invariant
because they arise from micro-founded models.
Second, the rational expectations assumption may constrain the ability of the current gener-
ation of macro models to characterize macro dynamics. Chief among these shortcomings is the
fact that agents only employ the variables used to construct the model in forming expectations of
future macro variables. Given that most macro models only use a limited number of variables, the
information sets used by RE agents seem to be unrealistically constrained2. There are a number of
potential avenues to overcome this problem. The generalized method of moments (GMM) allows
researchers to condition the estimation of model parameters on information sets which include
additional variables to those implied by the model (see, for instance, Clarida, Galı´, and Gertler
(1999)). Boivin and Giannoni (2008) estimate a DSGE RE macro model, enhancing the informa-
tion set available to agents for decision making purposes with a large number of macro variables
governed by a factor structure. Bekaert, Cho, and Moreno (2010), Bikbov and Chernov (2008), and
Rudebusch and Wu (2008) use term structure data to help identify a New-Keynesian macro model.
The work of Bikbov and Chernov (2008) is most closely related to ours, as they also allow regime
shifts in the shock variances and systematic monetary policy. However, their identification strategy
is very different, as they use term structure data and an exogenous pricing kernel (inconsistent with
the IS curve) to price the term structure.
Instead, we use survey-based expectations (SBE) to help identify the parameters of a DSGE
macro model. SBE reflect the direct answers of a large number of economic agents to ques-
tions about the expected future path of macroeconomic variables. Unlike RE, SBE are thus not
model conditioned and naturally reflect the different perceptions of economic agents based on a
potentially very rich information set. Recently, several authors (Roberts (1995), Adam and Padula
(2003) and Nunes (2007)) have estimated New-Keynesian Phillips curves using SBE. The results
of these efforts have overall been positive, as the estimate of the important Phillips curve param-
2Moreover, RE imply that all agents have a perfect knowledge of the model and only adjust their expectations
in reaction to the model dynamics in order to reach the equilibrium, leaving no room for any alternative perceptions
or mechanisms which in practice would likely alter their decisions. According to Solow (2004) and Phelps (2007),
this tight endogeneity of the RE framework may impair its ability to explain macro dynamics. On the theoretical side,
De Grauwe (2008) develops a DSGE model where agents exhibit bounded rationality, whereas Sims (2005) introduces
the rational inattention concept, relaxing some of the RE assumptions. In addition, Onatski and Stock (2002), among
others, develop techniques to perform policy analysis in the presence of model, parameter and shock uncertainty
around a reference model, thus leaving some room for macro realizations to deviate from a benchmark model with
perfectly known parameters and forcing processes.
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eter, linking inflation to the output gap, becomes statistically significant under SBE, in contrast to
the results produced by most RE models. Nevertheless, the use of SBE in DSGE macro models has
been limited to date and restricted to single-equation estimation. Of course, there is much skep-
ticism about SBE: agents may not be truth-telling or may omit important information in forming
forecasts of future macro variables. However, Ang, Bekaert, and Wei (2007) show that SBE of
inflation predict inflation out-of-sample better than a large number of the standard structural and
reduced-form inflation models proposed in the literature.3 Consequently, SBE likely contain im-
portant information about future macro variables. We show below that incorporating SBE greatly
facilitates the computation of the likelihood function and thus the identification of the regime shifts.
2.2 Introducing regime switches
We postulate the presence of 4 regime variables, to model regime shifts in the nature of systematic
monetary policy and in the variances of the structural shocks. The first variable smpt switches β and
γ in equation (3), which represent the systematic monetary policy parameters. The second variable
spit shifts the volatility of the aggregate supply shocks. The third variable s
y
t shifts the volatility of
the IS shocks. The fourth variable sit affects the volatility of the monetary policy shock. These
variables can take on two values and follow Markov chains with constant transition probabilities in
the Hamilton (1989) tradition. The agents are assumed to know the regime at each point in time so
that learning issues are dispensed with. In particular, agents rationally account for potential future
regime shifts in monetary policy, when taking expectations. We assume that the regime variables
are independent. For future reference, let St = (smpt ,spit ,s
y
t ,s
i
t).
The regime-dependent volatility model for the three shocks in equation (4) simply allows for
two different values of the conditional variance, as a function of the regime variable. For example,
for the AS equation, we have:
Var (εpi,t |Xt−1,St) = σ2pi (spit ) = exp(αpi,0+αpi,1spit ) (6)
with spit = 1,2 and the exponential function guaranteeing non-negative volatilities. We adopt the
convention that the variance in regime 1 is higher than the variance of regime 2 for each structural
shock: σ2pi (spit = 1)> σ2pi (spit = 2) ,σ2y
(
s
y
t = 1
)
> σ2y
(
s
y
t = 2
)
,σ2i
(
sit = 1
)
> σ2i
(
sit = 2
)
.
The regime variable smpt accommodates potential persistent shifts in the systematic policy pa-
rameters β and γ. In particular, we expect to find an activist regime with β larger than 1 and a
passive regime with β smaller than 1. A number of economists (Clarida, Galı´, and Gertler (1999),
3Boivin (2006), for instance, uses the Greenbook forecasts employed before each FOMC meeting by the Fed in
order to identify changes in its stance against inflation. These forecasts include information from a wide range of
sources, including forecasters’ opinions.
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Boivin and Giannoni (2006)) suggest that β experienced a structural break around 1980, with β
being lower than 1 before and larger thereafter. While we find such a model ex ante implausible,
it can still be approximated by our regime-switching model if the regimes are very persistent with
very small transition probabilities. Nevertheless, in our model, a switch to a new regime is never
viewed as permanent. If regime classification yields a passive regime 100% of the time before
1980, and an activist regime 100% of the time afterwards, the permanent break hypothesis surely
gains credence relative to a model of persistent but non-permanent changes in policy. It is also
possible that the influential 1979-1982 Volcker period affects inference substantially. Was this
period the first switch into a more active regime or is it best viewed as a period of discretionary
contractionary policy? By letting the variable sit affect the variability of the monetary policy shock,
we also accommodate the latter possibility.
Incorporating the regime variables, equation (4) becomes:
A(St)Xt = B(St)EtXt+1+DXt−1+ εt , εt ∼ N(0,Σ(St)) (7)
where A(St) and B(St) capture the regime-switching behavior of the central bank and Σ(St) gov-
erns the time-varying variances of the structural shocks. With regimes affecting both systematic
monetary policy and the variance of shocks, we can use the model to revisit the question of what
drove down inflation and output growth variability during the 1980s and 1990s: was it policy
or luck (see e.g. Stock and Watson (2002) and Blanchard and Simon (2001))? A large litera-
ture has examined this issue from both reduced-form (Cogley and Sargent (2005), McConnell and
Perez-Quiros (2000), Sims and Zha (2006)) and structural (Moreno (2004), Lubik and Schorfheide
(2004), Boivin and Giannoni (2006)) perspectives. Disagreement remains. For instance, Benati
and Surico (2009) show that the results of Sims and Zha (2006), suggesting a prominent role for
heteroskedasticity, may be biased against finding a role for policy changes. The combination of a
structural New-Keynesian model with regime shifts in both monetary policy parameters and shock
variables can provide novel evidence on the sources of macroeconomic dynamics.
Our model fits into a rapidly growing body of work incorporating policy changes and/or het-
eroskedasticity into New-Keynesian models. Part of this literature is more theoretical in nature,
considering issues of equilibrium existence and stability, in models that are not likely to be em-
pirically successful. We discuss this important literature in Section 2.3. The empirical literature
on DSGEs with time-varying parameter and shock distribution is very recent. Some authors, such
as Ferna´ndez-Villaverde and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2007) and Justiniano and Primiceri (2008), postu-
late heteroskedastic variances and fixed structural parameters in their DSGEs, whereas Davig and
Doh (2008) develop a New-Keynesian model with regime-switching parameters but constant shock
variances. Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerro´n-Quintana, and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2010), Bianchi (2011)
7
and Bikbov and Chernov (2008) allow for time variation in both the structural shock variances and
the systematic part of their RE New-Keynesian macro models, and are thus closest to our frame-
work. Bianchi (2011) uses only one regime variable to accommodate heteroskedasticity. We show
below that this is overly restrictive. Our use of SBE also allows for a much simpler estimation
method than is possible in Bianchi (2011).
2.3 The rational expectations equilibrium under regime-switching
A linear rational expectations model (4) is said to be determinate if it has a unique and stable (non-
explosive) equilibrium, which takes the form of a fundamental REE as in equation (5). In case of
indeterminacy, the models generally have multiple fundamental and non-fundamental (“sunspot”)
equilibria. It is also now well-understood that a violation of the Taylor principle, typically iden-
tified as β being less than 1 in equation (3), leads to indeterminate equilibria in the prototypical
New-Keynesian model. Intuitively, raising the short-term nominal interest rate less than one for
one to an increase in (expected) inflation actually lowers the real rate, fueling inflation even more
through output gap expansion and the Phillips curve mechanism. However, the US data seem to
suggest a structural break in β, with β lower than 1 (“passive policy’) before 1980 and higher than 1
(“active policy”) afterwards (Clarida, Galı´, and Gertler (1999), Boivin and Giannoni (2006)). From
the perspective of a standard New-Keynesian model, this implies that the propagation system was
not uniquely determined before 1980 and/or that non-fundamental (sunspot) equilibria may have
played a role before 1980 (see Lubik and Schorfheide (2004)).
Recently, Davig and Leeper (2007) generalized the Taylor principle to a baseline New-Keynesian
macro model with regime-switching in monetary policy, which is nested in the model of equation
(7). Specifically, they show that the model can have a unique bounded equilibrium even when
the central bank is temporarily passive as long as there is a positive probability that the passive
regime switches to the active regime, and the structural shocks are bounded. Consequently, a
Markov-switching rational expectations model (MSRE for short), apart from being more economi-
cally reasonable than a permanent break model, offers the potential to explain US macro-dynamics,
even before 1980, in the context of a model with a unique and stable equilibrium.
While our estimation uses survey based expectations, we restrict attention to parameters that
yield a fundamental rational expectations equilibrium, and identify the determinacy of the model
in a mean-square stability sense. First, in order to obtain a REE, we adopt the ”forward solution”
introduced by Cho and Moreno (2011). In a nutshell, the forward solution results from solving a
linear RE model recursively forward. If a forward solution exists, the parameters multiplying the
state variables converge, and hence, the recursion also yields the actual fundamental equilibrium.
Cho and Moreno (2011) show that the forward solution is the unique fundamental solution that sat-
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isfies the no-bubble (or transversality) condition; the condition that makes expectations of future
endogenous variables converge to zero. Consequently, the forward solution selects an economi-
cally reasonable fundamental equilibrium, irrespective of determinacy and delivers the numerical
solution in one step. Importantly, Cho (2011) shows that this logic carries over to MSRE models.
In particular, the forward solution to the Markov-switching model (7) follows the law of motion:
Xt = Ω(St)Xt−1+Γ(St)εt , εt ∼ N(0,Σ(St)), (8)
which depends only on the state variables, Xt−1 and the current state St in a nonlinear fashion. Note
that there are as many “different” reduced-form solutions as there are combinations of regimes, but
the coefficient matrices depend only on the monetary policy regime. This is the methodology we
follow to both compute and select the REE for our model. Consequently, our analysis excludes
non-fundamental equilibrium solutions and fundamental solutions that violate the transversality
condition.4
Second, we examine the determinacy of our estimated model. In contrast to linear models, the
determinacy concept should be carefully defined with an appropriately chosen stability criterion.
This is because standard determinacy conditions do not always easily generalize from linear to
MSRE models, as the debate between Davig and Leeper (2007) and Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha
(2009) illustrates. In particular, the bounded stability concept that Davig and Leeper (2007) and
Benhabib (2009) use, and which essentially requires bounded random variables, does not work in
our context, because determinacy conditions under bounded stability have not been established for
models with predetermined variables, and because the support of structural shocks in our models
is unbounded as we assume them to follow normal distributions. Therefore, we adopt mean-square
stability as the primary concept of stability, following Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2010) and
especially Cho (2011). Mean-square stability simply requires finite first and second moments.
Cho (2011) in particular has developed very tractable determinacy conditions in the mean-square
stability sense for general MSRE models with predetermined variables, which we rely upon here.
Thanks to the recent progress in solution methodologies for MSRE models, it is easy to check
whether a given model has stable fundamental solutions. Nevertheless, it is necessary to restrict
the structural parameters in order to ensure the existence of stable REEs in estimation. To do so
(and to aid our practical estimation), we conducted an extensive study of the existence of REE
for different parameter configurations. The analysis is described in more detail in Appendix A,
but we provide a short summary of the major findings here. Essentially, we conduct a grid search
over an extensive parameter range, and verify whether we can characterize the set of parameters
4Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2011) also propose a numerical solution method and a likelihood-based refinement
scheme for fundamental solutions. However, a solution chosen by their likelihood-based criterion violates the no-
bubble condition whenever it differs from the forward solution.
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for which a fundamental forward solution exists. This proved a non-trivial task and no simple
characterization is possible. However, the most critical parameters in driving the existence of a
REE clearly are (δ,µ,β1,β2). Recall that β1 > β2, identifying the first regime as the “active”
regime. Not surprisingly, given Davig and Leeper’s work, an equilibrium can still exist with β2
smaller than 1, and β1 larger than 1. Values of µ and δ smaller than 0.5 will lead to non-existence,
but an equilibrium may exist if only one of the two is smaller than 0.5 (and the other one relatively
high).
We use this information to consider a restricted parameter space for the estimation (see more
below). Nevertheless, estimating the model in Equations (7)-(8) with a relatively large number of
regime variables remains difficult. In order to construct the likelihood function, we must not only
integrate across all combinations of potential (unobserved) regimes, but also numerically compute
the highly non-linear reduced-form coefficient matrices (Ω(St) and Γ(St)) for all combinations of
potential regimes. We circumvent this problem and simultaneously bring additional information to
bear on the estimation by incorporating survey forecasts, as we show in the next subsection.
2.4 Introducing survey expectations
Undoubtedly, the information used by professional forecasters greatly exceeds the information
set spanned by the variables present in the simple model in equations (1)-(3). Given that survey
expectations outperform empirical and theoretical models predicting inflation, they can also prove
useful in estimating macroeconomic parameters and dynamics. To incorporate SBE into the model,
we assume that survey expectations of inflation and output obey the following law of motion:
pi
f
t = αEtpit+1+(1−α)pi ft−1+wpit (9)
y ft = αEtyt+1+(1−α)y ft−1+wyt (10)
with wpit ∼ N
(
0,σpif
)
and wyt ∼ N
(
0,σyf
)
. Consequently, survey expectations potentially react to
true rational expectations one for one if α equals 1, but may also slowly adjust to true rational
expectations and depend on past survey expectations. This is reminiscent of Mankiw and Reis
(2002)’s model of the Phillips curve, in which information disseminates slowly throughout the
population.
In our model, we combine the determination of SBE with the regime-switching counterparts of
equations (1)-(3). That is, we retain the assumption of rational expectations, and simply use addi-
tional information to identify both the structural parameters and the regimes in a 5 variable system.
Nevertheless, the estimation remains complex as we still need to solve the rational expectations
equilibrium at each step in the optimization and for all possible regime combinations. If we let
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the variance of the shocks in equations (9)-(10) go to zero, so that SBE are an exact function of
past SBE and current RE, we can greatly simplify estimation. In this case, we can infer the RE of
inflation and output from equations (9) and (10) and substitute them into the main model equations
to obtain:
pit =
δ
α
(pi ft − (1−α)pi ft−1)+(1−δ)pit−1+λyt + εpi,t , εpi,t ∼ N(0,σ2pi(spit )) (11)
yt =
µ
α
(y ft − (1−α)y ft−1)+(1−µ)yt−1−φit +
φ
α
(pi ft − (1−α)pi ft−1)+ εy,t , (12)
εy,t ∼ N(0,σ2y(syt ))
it = ρit−1+(1−ρ)[β(s
mp
t )
α
(pi ft − (1−α)pi ft−1)+ γ(smpt )yt ]+ εi,t , (13)
εi,t ∼ N(0,σ2i (sit))
Notice that when α = 1, the RE are assumed equivalent with SBE. We ask the data to gauge the
wedge between those two expectations. The parameter α generally measures the relative weight
of RE and past SBE in expectation formation for professional forecasters.
Let X ft =
[
pi
f
t y
f
t
]′
. In matrix form, the regime-switching New-Keynesian model becomes:
A(St)Xt = B(St)X ft +D(St)X
f
t−1+FXt−1+ εt , εt ∼ N(0,Σ(St)) (14)
with:
A(St) =
 1 −λ 00 1 φ
0 −(1−ρ)γ(smpt ) 1
 , B(St) =

δ
α 0
φ
α
µ
α
(1−ρ)
α β(smpt ) 0
 ,
D(St) =
 −
δ(1−α)
α 0
−φ(1−α)α −µ(1−α)α
−(1−ρ)(1−α)
α β(smpt ) 0
 , F =
 (1−δ) 0 00 (1−µ) 0
0 0 ρ
 ,
and conditional on α 6= 0,
Σ(St) =
 σAS(s
pi
t ) 0 0
0 σIS(syt ) 0
0 0 σMP(sit)
 .
This model leads to the following reduced-form:
Xt = Ω1(St)X ft−1+Ω2(St)X
f
t +Ω3(St)Xt−1+Γ(St)εt , εt ∼ N(0,Σ(St)), (15)
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with Ω1(St)=A(St)−1B(St), Ω2(St)=A(St)−1D(St), Ω3(St)=A(St)−1F and Γ(St)=A(St)−1.
A major advantage of this approach is that the matrices determining the law of motion of Xt are
simple analytical functions of the structural parameters, thus making the likelihood function much
easier to compute, simplifying estimation. There is no need to compute the REE at each step in
the optimization of the likelihood, and the regimes can be inferred as in the standard reduced-form
multivariate models (see Hamilton (1989) and Sims and Zha (2006)). Importantly, SBE adds new
information, absent in the variables and structure of the New-Keynesian model, to aid parameter
estimation.
3 Data and Estimation
The model requires analogs for five variables: inflation, the output gap, the short-term interest rate,
and survey-based estimates of expected inflation and the expected output gap. Inflation is measured
as the log-difference of the chain-type Gross Domestic Product (GDP) deflator price index. The
output measure is real GDP and we employ a quadratic trend to measure potential output. We report
results for the output gap measure computed using a quadratic trend. We retrieve both the GDP
and GDP deflator data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis database. Expected inflation is the
median survey responses of expected GDP inflation over the next quarter. To construct the expected
output gap, we use current GDP and expected GDP growth over the next quarter. We again use
the median survey response to proxy for expected GDP growth. The series is then appropriately
detrended. Both expected inflation and output are from the Survey of Professional Forecasters
(SPF) published by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia. Finally, the short-term interest
rate is the 3-month treasury bill (secondary market rate). The data frequency is quarterly and our
sample period goes from the fourth quarter of 1968 to the second quarter of 2008. Appendix B has
more details on the data.
The model in (15) is estimated via limited information maximum likelihood, given that we do
not use the pi ft and y
f
t equations. The information set It−1 consists of all the available information
up to time t−1: It−1 = {Qt−1,Qt−2, . . . ,Q0}, where Qt = [Xt X ft ]′. The full dataset is thus ˜QT =
[QT ,QT−1, . . . ,Q0]. We denote the parameters to be estimated as θ, so that the aim is to maximize
the density function f ( ˜QT ;θ). While agents in the economy observe the regime variables, St , the
econometrician does not and only has data on Qt . Therefore, we maximize the likelihood function
for ˜QT , integrating out the dependence on St , as is typical in the regime-switching literature5.
We would like the estimation to produce parameters for which a fundamental rational expecta-
5We sacrifice full efficiency by ignoring f (X ft |It−1;θ) in the estimation. Technically, this requires assuming
f (X ft |St , It−1;θ) = f (X ft |It−1;θ). While not very palatable at first, in our model, the regimes can in principle be iden-
tified without using survey data, so that the assumption is implicitly valid.
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tions equilibrium exists. To do so, we proceed in two steps. First, we use the analysis of Section 2.3
to construct a compact parameter space that attempts to exclude regions where REEs are unlikely
to exist. Because of the non-convexity of the set, we use a rather wide parameter space (details
are available upon request), that encompasses the parameter values yielding a REE. Second, at
each step in the optimization, we verify whether the forward solution exists. If not, the likelihood
function is penalized, steering optimization away from such regions in the parameter space.
Appendix C describes the different specification tests that we perform on the residuals of the
model. First, for each equation, we test the hypotheses of a zero mean and zero serial correlation
(up to two lags) of the residuals (the “mean test”); unit mean and zero serial correlation (two
lags) for the squared standardized residuals (the “variance test”); zero skewness, and appropriate
kurtosis. In performing these tests, we recognize that the test statistics may be biased in small
samples, especially if the data generating process is as non-linear as the model is above. Therefore,
we use critical values from a small Monte Carlo analysis also described in Appendix C. Second,
the economic model should also capture the correlation between the various variables. We test
for each residual whether its joint covariances with all other residuals are indeed zero. We also
perform a joint test for all covariances. As in the first set of tests, we obtain critical values from a
small Monte Carlo analysis.
Table 1 reports Monte Carlo p-values of all these tests for our main model, on the left hand
side. The residual levels and variances are well behaved, with the exception of the output gap,
where the test uncovers some remaining autocorrelation in the residuals. The regime-switching
model is able to capture most skewness and kurtosis in the data, only failing the zero skewness
test for inflation. The model’s weakest point appears to be the fit of covariances between the three
shocks. The last two lines in Table 1 reveal that the model fails to fully capture the correlation
structure between the various economic variables.
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Parameter estimates
Table 2 presents the parameter estimates of the Regime-Switching DSGE New-Keynesian macro
model yielding a stable and determinate RE equilibrium, as described in Section 2.3. It also shows
a number of statistical tests of parameter equality. All parameters have the right sign and are
statistically significant, but we did constrain the φ coefficient to a positive value of 0.1. As is
common in maximum likelihood estimation of this class of New-Keynesian models, unconstrained
estimation yields either negative or very small and insignificant estimates of φ (see Ireland (2001),
Fuhrer and Rudebusch (2004) and Cho and Moreno (2006)).
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In the AS equation, δ is 0.425, implying a similar weight on the forward-looking and endoge-
nous persistence terms. The IS equation is more forward looking, since µ is 0.675. Given the small
standard errors of these parameters, our estimation reveals strong evidence in favor of endogenous
persistence.
The Phillips curve parameter λ is large at 0.102, implying a strong transmission mechanism
from output to inflation and thus a strong monetary policy transmission mechanism. Previous es-
timations of rational expectations models fail to obtain reasonable and significant estimates of λ
with quarterly data (Fuhrer and Moore (1995)). Some alternative estimations have yielded signifi-
cant estimates, such as Galı´ and Gertler (1999) who use a measure for marginal cost replacing the
output gap; Bekaert, Cho, and Moreno (2010) who identify a natural rate of output process from
term structure data; or Roberts (1995) and Adam and Padula (2003) who use SBE but in a single
equation context with fixed regimes. However, our estimate is even larger than the coefficients
reported in these articles. We conjecture that the introduction of slow moving SBE of inflation
generates additional correlation between (expected) inflation and the output gap.
Regarding the monetary policy rule, the interest rate persistence is large, 0.834, in agreement
with most studies in the literature (Clarida, Galı´, and Gertler (1999), Bekaert, Cho, and Moreno
(2010), among others). Our estimation allows for regime switches in the key monetary policy
parameters, β, the response to expected inflation, and γ, the response to the output gap. In the
“activist” regime, β is 2.312, well above 1 statistically, whereas in the passive regime, β is 0.598,
significantly below 1. Thus, our estimation clearly identifies a sharp economic and statistical
difference in the response to inflation across monetary policy regimes. In their single equation
monetary policy rule estimation, Davig and Leeper (2005) also estimate a significant difference
between β’s across regimes, but of a smaller magnitude than our estimates. The contemporaneous
articles of Bikbov and Chernov (2008) and Bianchi (2011), estimating Markov-switching RE New-
Keynesian models, also identify a large difference in β across regimes. The interest rate response to
the output gap, γ, is higher than in the aforementioned estimations (1.187 and 0.687, respectively),
and it is larger in the more “activist” regime, although not in a statistically significant way.
Finally, α, the parameter governing the law of motion for the survey-based expectations, is
0.986, meaning that SBE adjust almost completely to RE. We examine below whether this finding
is the result of imposing rational expectations on the estimation. Because the other parameters are
directly related to the identification of the regimes, we discuss them in the next sub-section.
4.2 Macroeconomic regimes
The key output of our model is the identification of macroeconomic regimes. The volatility param-
eters imply strong evidence of time-varying variances in macroeconomic shocks. For the output
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gap and inflation shocks, volatility in the high volatility regime is around double that in the low
volatility regime. However, for interest rates, the high volatility regime features volatility that is
about 6 times as high as in quiet times, suggesting a potentially important role for discretionary
monetary policy. Because interest rates are measured in quarterly percent, the volatility of interest
rate shocks in the low volatility state is very small (0.04%), implying a strict commitment to the
monetary policy rule.
The transition probability coefficients imply overall quite persistent regimes. For inflation,
the expected duration of the high variance regime is very high at 100 quarters, but the low vari-
ance regime is persistent as well. Output gap regimes are somewhat less persistent, with the high
variance regime expected to last about 27 quarters, while discretionary interest rate regimes are
much less persistent, with the high interest rate variability regime expected to last about 8 quarters.
Accommodating monetary policy regimes last on average longer than activist regimes, which are
short-lived lasting on average 7 quarters.
These transition probabilities are important inputs in the identification of the time path of the
regimes. Figure 1 plots the smoothed probabilities for the four independent regime variables. Panel
A shows the smoothed probabilities of respectively the high inflation shock volatility regime and
the high output shock volatility regime. Note that the regime probabilities tend to be either close to
one or zero, indicating adequate regime identification. We observe a sudden drop in output shock
volatility starting in 1981 and fully materializing in 1985. The decreased volatility persists until
2007, coinciding with the onset of the credit crisis. The variability of inflation shocks starts to
decrease later, with the smoothed probability going below 0.5 at the beginning of 1986, and going
toward zero just before the 1990 recession. Signs of a reversal in the low variability regime are
already visible in 2003, with its probability reaching less than 50 percent in the third quarter of
2006 already. Our evidence in favor of a switch towards a higher variability regime is stronger and
its timing earlier than in Bikbov and Chernov (2008).
Panel B shows the smoothed probabilities of respectively the active monetary policy regime
in which the Fed aggressively stabilizes inflation, and the high volatility regime for interest rate
shocks. The high interest rate shock volatility regime occurs quite frequently and is always on
during recessions, including during the 1980-1982 Volcker period. This implies that in times of
recession, the Fed is more willing to deviate from the interest rate rule. Bikbov and Chernov (2008)
also categorize the Volcker period as a period of discretionary monetary policy. Unlike their results,
we also find systematic monetary policy to be activist during this period. Interestingly, our model
shows that activist monetary policy spells generally became more frequent from 1980 onwards. We
identify the 1993-2000 period as an accommodating monetary policy stance. Because this period
is characterized by relatively low inflation, a passive monetary policy stance implies relatively
high interest rates. One interpretation is that inflation expectations were firmly anchored, due to
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the more aggressive stance of the Fed during the previous decade. In addition, the possibility of
switching back to the stabilizing regime, as captured by our regime-switching DSGE, may also
anchor inflation expectations. Notice that this regime identification is quite different from the
permanent shift in monetary policy around 1980, put forward in earlier studies such as Clarida,
Galı´, and Gertler (1999) and Lubik and Schorfheide (2004), but consistent with contemporaneous
results in Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerro´n-Quintana, and Rubio-Ramı´rez (2010).
In 2000 there is a switch to the activist regime, as interest rates rapidly declined following the
beginning of the 2000 recession, while inflation stayed low. Hence, according to our analysis,
interest rates in the first 5 years of the previous decade were lower than what was prescribed
by the Taylor rule (see Taylor (2009)). Bernanke (2010) ascribes this to the “jobless recovery”
experienced at the time, but some may surmise that this aggressive monetary policy was one of the
root causes of the recent credit crisis (see Rajan (2006)). The recent credit crisis starting in 2007 is
preceded by a passive monetary policy regime which, given the low inflation environment, implies
that interest rates increased. In the beginning of the credit crunch, our model identifies a switch
towards an (expansionary) discretionary monetary policy, whereas the probability of a systematic
stabilizing policy also increases, leading to a sharp decline of interest rates.
4.3 Stability and Determinacy under Rational Expectations.
We now compute the forward solution of the model to determine a fundamental solution consis-
tent with the transversality condition, and examine determinacy under rational expectations. The
forward solution has the form of equation (8) and the coefficient matrices Ω and Γ are given by:
Ω
(
s
mp
t = 1
)
=
 0.884 0.067 −0.198−0.061 0.391 −0.424
0.272 0.102 0.610
 , Ω(smpt = 2)=
 1.184 0.093 −0.6260.480 0.444 −1.161
0.186 0.062 0.583

Γ
(
s
mp
t = 1
)
=
 1.537 0.206 −0.238−0.106 1.204 −0.510
0.474 0.312 0.732
 , Γ(smpt = 2)=
 2.060 0.286 −0.7510.834 1.366 −1.393
0.323 0.190 0.699

Note that the volatility regime variables do not affect these coefficient matrices. Γ
(
s
mp
t
)
governs
the initial responses of the structural shocks to the variables. For instance, inflation and the output
gap fall following a contractionary monetary policy shock (see third column of each Γ). In the
case of a positive inflation shock, if the initial stance of monetary policy is active
(
s
mp
t = 1
)
, the
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output gap falls and inflation rises. However, when the policy is passive, the central bank raises the
nominal interest rate less than one for one, reducing the real interest rate. This actually raises the
output gap as the (2,1)-th component of Γ
(
s
mp
t = 2
)
is positive.
Next, we examine determinacy of the model in the mean-square stability sense. As Cho (2011)
shows, the general solution is given by:
Xt = Ω
(
s
mp
t
)
Xt−1+Γ
(
s
mp
t
)
εt +ut , (16)
s.t. ut = F
(
s
mp
t
)
Etut+1 (17)
where F
(
s
mp
t
)
=
(
In−Et
[
A
(
s
mp
t
)
Ω
(
s
mp
t+1
)])−1 A(smpt ). Note that there are in general many com-
binations of
{
Ω
(
s
mp
t
)
,Γ
(
s
mp
t
)}
, each of which constitutes a fundamental solution. Moreover,
there exist uncountably many processes satisfying (16). Therefore, determinacy is the case where
there exists a unique stable fundamental solution and there is no stable process ut . As we men-
tioned earlier, mean-square stability simply implies that the underlying process has a finite first and
second moment. To proceed, define 2n2× 2n2 probability-weighted matrices ¯ΨΩ⊗Ω and ΨF⊗F
such that (i, j)-th n2 × n2 blocks of them are respectively p jiΩ( j)⊗Ω( j) and pi jF (i)⊗ F (i)
for all i, j = 1,2. Cho (2011) shows that if the forward solution exists and rσ
(
¯ΨΩ⊗Ω
)
< 1 and
rσ (ΨF⊗F) ≤ 1 where rσ (.) is a maximum absolute value of the argument matrix, then the model
is determinate. Intuitively, when a given model is regime-independent and there is no prede-
termined variable, then F is simply A, and rσ (A) ≤ 1 is a standard determinacy condition. In
a regime-switching environment, the relevant matrix is replaced with the probability-weighted
matrix ΨF⊗F . Using the forward solution computed at the estimated parameter values, we have
rσ
(
¯ΨΩ⊗Ω
)
= 0.775 and rσ (ΨF⊗F) = 1.25. Therefore, the determinacy condition does not hold.
In order to ensure that there exist mean-square stable bubble components, we search for mean-
square stable bubbles, again following Cho (2011), and find that there exists a continuum of stable
ut . Hence, our estimated model is indeterminate.6 Facing indeterminacy, many researchers take
a fundamental stable solution as the most relevant equilibrium to a given model among all stable
solutions based on some solution selection criteria, for instance, McCallum (1983), Evans and
6Specifically, following Farmer, Waggoner, and Zha (2009), the functional form of ut subject to (17) can be written
as:
ut = Λ
(
s
mp
t−1,s
mp
t
)
ut−1+ηt
where Λ depends on both current and lagged regime variables and ηt is appropriately defined. What Cho (2011)
shows is that 1/rσ (ΨF⊗F) is the lower bound of rσ
(
¯ΨΛ⊗Λ
)
among all the possible Λ in the equation above where
the (i, j) -th n2×n2 block of ¯ΨΛ⊗Λ is p jiΛ( j, i)⊗Λ( j, i). Since 1/rσ (ΨF⊗F) < 1 in our model, where F is implied
by the forward solution, we search for Λ and find that there is a Λ∗ that yields rσ
(
¯ΨΛ∗⊗Λ∗
)
= 1/rσ (ΨF⊗F) < 1,
implying that ut with Λ∗ is mean-square stable. It should be stressed that there exists a continuum of Λ yielding
rσ
(
¯ΨΛ⊗Λ
) ∈ [1/rσ (ΨF⊗F) ,1), indicating that a bubble component can have an arbitrarily large variance. In such an
environment, there has been no guidance for selecting a particular bubble solution as a relevant equilibrium to the
model.
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Honkapohja (2001) or Bullard and Mitra (2002). We also follow their approach, but take the for-
ward solution as representing the equilibrium to our estimated model as it is the unique solution
that satisfies the no-bubble condition of Cho (2011), which is the only solution refinement scheme
available for MSRE models. We are also able to gauge how far the estimated model is from the de-
terminacy region. Figure 2 plots determinacy and indeterminacy regions in terms of β1 against β2,
holding other parameters fixed. Clearly, the policy stance in our MSRE model can be temporarily
passive, and still yield a determinate equilibrium; however, it cannot be too passive. Recall that the
passive policy stance had prevailed in the pre-Volker era and for more than half of the post-Volker
regime. Reflecting this fact, our estimate of β2 is low, namely 0.598, putting the model in the in-
determinacy region. To ensure determinacy, β2 should be greater than 0.936. Several articles have
identified spells of passive monetary policy before (Ferna´ndez-Villaverde, Guerro´n-Quintana, and
Rubio-Ramı´rez (2010), Bianchi (2011)) but our article is the first to characterize determinacy and
show that recent passive policy stances result in an overall indeterminate MSRE equilibrium for
the US economy. We also vary other estimated parameter values to examine how sensitive the
determinacy region is. Changes in most structural parameters have little effect on the determi-
nacy region with the exception of ρ. When ρ becomes larger, determinacy may require both policy
regimes to be active if one regime is too active relative to the other as Cho (2011) shows.
4.4 Impulse responses
A nice feature of our model is that the impulse responses are regime-dependent, and should dif-
fer across regimes. Because agents are assumed to know the regime, we compute the impulse
responses using an information set that incorporates both data and the regime; they follow from
calculating E
[
Xt+k|It ,smpt = i
]
, for i = 1,2. Appendix D describes a simple procedure to compute
these impulse responses recursively. Note that this computation takes into account the expectations
of agents regarding future switches in the monetary policy regime.
Figures 3 to 5 produce these regime dependent impulse responses of all three macro-variables
to one-standard deviation shocks, focusing on, respectively, AS, IS and monetary policy shocks.
In each figure, there are three panels corresponding to the three macro-variables. We show 4
different impulse responses, depending on the monetary policy regime and the shock volatility
regime. While the volatility regimes only affect the initial size of the shock, the relative magnitude
of the impulse responses helps us interpret macroeconomic dynamics in different time periods.
Figure 3 focuses on AS shocks. This is of considerable interest as there is a lively debate on
whether the stagflations of the seventies were partially policy driven. The figure shows that fol-
lowing an AS shock, inflation is highest in the high inflation shock volatility - passive monetary
policy regime, as was observed in the 1970s, and lowest in the low inflation shock volatility - ac-
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tivist monetary policy regime, as observed from 1985 to 1993. It is especially activist monetary
policy that contributes to a lower inflation response. Investigating output gap responses, a positive
AS shock drives down the output gap in a protracted way under an activist monetary policy re-
sponse, because the real interest rate increases. However, the output gap increases when monetary
policy is accommodating as then the real interest rate decreases following a positive AS shock.
However, after about 6-7 quarters, the output gap is lower under an accommodating regime than
it is under an activist regime. The effect of AS shocks on nominal interest rates is also strikingly
regime-dependent. Except for the initial periods, the accommodating regime yields higher nominal
interest rate responses than the activist regime. This is because under accommodating monetary
policy, it takes time for inflation to decrease - both through the direct effect of monetary policy
and through expectations -, so that interest rates must be kept high for a long time. The regime-
dependent responses therefore provide simultaneously an interesting interpretation of the historical
record on the macroeconomic response to the negative aggregate supply shocks in the seventies and
a counter-factual analysis. The accommodating policy regime implied (excessively) high interest
rates, high inflation, and a substantial long term loss in output. The responses under an activist
regime show that an aggressive Fed could have likely lowered the magnitude of the inflation re-
sponse, reduced inflation volatility, kept interest rates overall lower and avoided the longer-term
output loss, at the cost of a short-term loss over the first 5 quarters.
Figure 4 shows the responses to the IS shock. The inflation responses are similar across mon-
etary policy regimes, but move over a wider range under the accommodating regime. In that
regime, inflation rates move substantially below their mean during some periods, simultaneously
with the interest rate undershooting its mean. The output gap responses are also quite similar
across regimes. The similarity of the responses may have something to do with the fact that mon-
etary policy reacts similarly to demand shocks across both regimes. While Panel C shows that
the interest response to a demand shock is higher in the activist regime, the response differences
are both in absolute and relative terms multiple times smaller than the responses to supply shocks,
observed in Figure 3.
Finally, Figure 5 shows the responses to the monetary policy shock. Clearly, the activist mon-
etary policy regime implies (much) more stable inflation and output dynamics than the passive
regime. The macroeconomic volatility under the accommodating regime is especially dramatic
when the interest rate shock is in the high volatility regime (recall that the interest rate shock
volatility is multiple times higher in that case). A contractionary monetary policy shock lowers
inflation and the output gap in both regimes, but, as the third panel shows, this is not only accom-
modated with less macroeconomic but also less interest rate volatility in the activist regime.
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4.5 Macro-variability and its Sources
US economic history has witnessed profound changes in the volatility of macroeconomic variables
over time, as evidenced by the literature on the Great Moderation. In the context of our model,
this time variation in macroeconomic variability is driven by changing regimes in the variability
of macroeconomic shocks (driven by spit ,syt ,sit) and regime dependent feedback parameters, which
also depend on the monetary policy regime, smpt . In this section, we derive the unconditional and
regime–dependent variances of our macro variables, and provide different decompositions to shed
light on the sources of macroeconomic variability.
4.5.1 A Variance Decomposition
The regime variable St contains 16 different regimes, as each of the four independent regimes, smpt ,
spit , s
y
t and sit has two states. Appendix E shows in detail how to compute the unconditional variance
as a sum of regime-dependent variances:
Var(Xt) =
S
∑
i=1
Var(Xt |St = i) ·Pi (18)
where Pi = Pr(St = i) is the unconditional, ergodic regime probability, and S = 16. Appendix E
also derives closed-form expressions for the regime-dependent variances. We then compute the
contribution of a particular regime to the total variance as:
rx(St = i) =
Var(xt |St = i)Pi
Var(xt)
(19)
where xt represents pit , yt or it .
Table 3 reports these ratios together with the long run, ergodic distribution (Pi). For instance,
the regime combination of an active monetary policy and high shock volatility across all three
equations contributes 1.24, 1.98 and 3.17% to the total variance of inflation, the output gap and the
interest rate, respectively. The regimes contributing the most to the unconditional variance reflect
passive monetary policy, the high variability regime for inflation shocks and the low variability
regime for output shocks. The latter is true because the low variability regime for output occurs
more frequently than the high variability regime (69.81% versus 30.19% in fact), whereas the
opposite is true for inflation shocks, where the high variability regime occurs 68.97% of the time
and also for interest rate shocks where the high variability regime occurs 59.47% of the time.
The most noticeable result is that in all cases, the contribution to total variance of any variable
is much smaller under the active monetary regime than it is under the passive regime. For instance,
when the economy is in the high volatility regime for all shocks, the active regime contributes
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only 1.98% to the total variance of the output gap, whereas the passive regime contributes 14.31%,
about 7.23 times more. Of course, the contribution could simply be low because the active regime
has a much lower probability of occurring. In the high volatility regimes, the ergodic probability
of the active regime is 3.23% while it is 9.16% under the passive regime, about three times higher.
Therefore, even after controlling for differences in ergodic probabilities, the volatility of the output
gap under the active regime is much smaller than that under the passive regime. This is generally
true for all regime combinations and all the macro-variables.
To see this more explicitly, Table 4 shows variance ratios for the various regimes, Var(xt |St =
i)/Var(xt), that is the variance in that particular regime relative to the unconditional variance.
Strikingly, the variance ratio for output and inflation variability in the active regime when all the
shocks are in the high variability regime is lower than the variance ratio for the output and inflation
variability in the passive regime when all the shocks are in the low variability regime. This suggests
that the monetary policy regime has a rather important impact on macro-variability and perhaps an
impact that exceeds the impact of the variability of macro shocks.
To compare the relative effect on variability of shocks versus policy, the last line shows the
ratio of the variance in a regime where all macro shocks are in the high variability regime versus
the variance of a regime where all the macro shocks are in the low variability regime. These ratios
obviously depend on the macro variable and the policy regime, but their range is rather narrow
varying between 2.30 and 2.87. To compare this to the effect of monetary policy, Table 5 shows
the ratio of the passive versus active variances, controlling for the shock variability regimes. It is
obvious that policy has a relatively larger effect on output and inflation variances than do macro
shocks. In terms of variances, the passive monetary policy regime leads to variances of inflation
and the output gap that are about two to five times as large as their variances in the active regime.
4.5.2 The Great Moderation
The above computations can also help us identify the start and the end of the Great Moderation. In
our model, the Great Moderation is a period in which the time-varying variance is substantially be-
low its unconditional counterpart. Recall that the variance can take on 16 different values as there
are 16 regimes. At each point of time, agents in the economy know the regime (and hence the
variance), but we can only estimate the probabilities of different regimes occurring using the data.
We therefore estimate the variance at each point of time as the sum of the regime-dependent vari-
ances weighted by their associated time-varying smoothed regime probabilities using full sample
information. That is,
V̂ar(Xt) =
S
∑
i=1
Var[Xt |St = i]P[St = i|IT ] (20)
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If regime classification is perfect (that is, the smoothed probabilities are zero or 1), the summation
simply selects one of the 16 regime-dependent variances. Because regime-classification in a system
with 16 regimes is unlikely to be perfect, using smoothed regime probabilities to average the
regime-dependent variances seems reasonable.
Figure 6 graphs the ratio of an estimate of the time-varying variance relative to the uncondi-
tional variance for inflation, the output gap and interest rates. Visually, the graph clearly identifies
the Great Moderation lasting from the third quarter of 1980 to the third quarter of 2007, with in-
flation and output variability being substantially below the 1 line, often even being less than 50%
of the unconditional variance. Do note that there are short episodes during the Great Moderation
where inflation and particularly output variability briefly spike up.
Our previous computations suggest that policy played a rather important role in the Great Mod-
eration. For example, it is striking that we identify the Great Moderation to start before the shock
variabilities move to a lower variability regime. This is, of course, due to a switch from a passive to
active monetary policy regime around 1980. To visualize the effect of policy on macro-variances,
we run a counterfactual analysis. In Figure 7, we graph a volatility ratio, namely the standard
deviation of the three macro variables, conditional on the monetary policy regime always being in
the passive regime versus the actual time-varying volatility, that is, the square root of the variance
computed in Equation (20). When computing the counterfactual volatility, the underlying variance
computation transfers mass from states where smpt = 1 to the corresponding state (and its vari-
ance) where smpt = 2. Figure 8 does the opposite computation, it computes the volatility assuming
the monetary policy regime is always activist, and graphs the ratio of the actual over the activist
volatility.7
With these two graphs in hand, we can reinterpret the historical evolution of macro-volatility
as generated by our model. In the seventies, macro-volatility was around twice as high as it could
have been, had monetary policy been active (see Figure 8). From 1981 to 1993, active monetary
policy managed to reduce macro-volatility substantially - it would have been 50% to 200% higher
otherwise (Figure 7). The relatively subdued macro-variability after 1993 to around 2000 was due
to low variability in the macro shocks, as monetary policy was passive. Of course, as we have
argued before, the earlier aggressive policy stance may have helped anchor expectations during a
rather mild macroeconomic climate. Taking our model literally, monetary policy could have further
reduced macro-volatility by continuing to be aggressive. Because inflation was low at that time, an
active monetary policy would have meant lower interest rates. The jump in counterfactual volatility
7Specifically, we define the counterfactual probability measure of permanently passive monetary policy regime
as ˆP(St = i|Passive, IT ) where ˆP(smpt = 1, j,k, l|IT ) = 0 and ˆP(smpt = 2, j,k, l|IT ) = P(smpt = 1, j,k, l|IT ) +P(smpt =
2, j,k, l|IT ) for all spit = j, syt = k, sit = l, j,k, l = 1,2. Using this probability measure, we can define the time-varying
variance of the policy being always passive as V̂ar[Xt |Passive]. The counterfactual activist probability measure and
activist variance can also be defined analogously. Figure 7 and 8 depict respectively
√
V̂ar[Xt |Passive]√
V̂ar(Xt )
and
√
V̂ar(Xt )√
V̂ar[Xt |Active]
.
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around 2000 in Figure 7 is the more dramatic of the two graphs. In other words, if monetary policy
had remained passive, macro-volatilities would have increased substantially. Bernanke’s (2010)
speech explicitly discusses this episode as the Federal Reserve reacting aggressively to a deflation
scare, reducing the interest rate way below what a standard Taylor rule would predict. The period
also witnessed a number of macroeconomic shocks that could have caused macro-volatility to
increase and augmented recession risk, such as the events of September 11, 2001.
4.6 Rational expectations versus survey expectations
Our estimation imposes a parameter space that ensures the existence of a fundamental rational
expectations equilibrium. What happens if this assumption is relaxed? Table 7 shows the results for
the unconstrained estimation. In Table 1, the right-hand side panel also produces specification tests
for this model. The model only performs marginally better than the constrained model. Moreover,
the resulting estimates imply explosive dynamics for the RE model. Nevertheless, it is noteworthy
that the parameter estimates are very similar to those obtained in the constrained estimation. The
only significant difference is that µ, the forward-looking parameter in the IS equation, is now
significantly smaller, 0.331, relative to 0.675 before. This is similar to the values obtained by
Fuhrer and Rudebusch (2004), in their systematic single equation estimation in a fixed regime
context. Bekaert, Cho, and Moreno (2010) also estimate a lower value for µ, namely 0.422, but
this is coupled with a high estimate for the degree of forward-looking behavior in the AS equation
(δ in our model). As we have verified through simulation exercises, the combination of low δ and
low µ –maintaining standard values for other parameters - implies the non-existence of a stable RE
equilibrium, both in a fixed regime and in a multiple regime context. In economic terms, stable RE
dynamics require AS and IS equations with a sufficient degree of forward looking behavior, such
that shocks are rapidly absorbed.
Finally, α, the parameter governing the law of motion for the survey-based expectations, is
0.410 in the unconstrained case, whereas it was 0.986 in the constrained estimation. This is an im-
portant difference. When we enforce a stable RE, RE appear indistinguishable from SBE, whereas
in the unconstrained estimation, SBE slowly adjust to RE, being heavily influenced by past expec-
tations. In fact, α is statistically indistinguishable from 0.5, implying that rational expectations and
past survey-based expectations obtain similar relative weights in the expectations formation pro-
cess. In other words, viewed through the lens of this macroeconomic model, survey expectations
only slowly adjust to rational expectations, being heavily influenced by past expectations. This is
consistent with Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2003), who show that the adjustment of SBE to the
macro environment is gradual. Conversely, the dependence on rational expectations is highly sig-
nificant, implying that survey expectations likely convey much information, useful in estimating
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macroeconomic parameters and dynamics.
Figure 9 shows the regime probabilities for the unconstrained model, which should be com-
pared to Figure 1 for the RE model. Focusing first on Panel B, the monetary policy regime identifi-
cation, both for systematic and discretionary policy is very similar, qualitatively and quantitatively,
to that in the constrained estimation. In Panel A, we observe some differences in terms of output
shock regime identification. First, the high output volatility prevails from the beginning of the
sample, whereas in the constrained estimation this regime appears more gradually. In addition,
the Great Moderation in terms of output volatility shocks starts abruptly around 1986, which is a
few years later than in the constrained estimation. Second, the low volatility output shock regime
already ends in 2000, much earlier than in the constrained optimization. These differences can
be easily understood examining the transition probabilities of the IS shock regime variable across
estimations (see Tables 2 and 6). The unconstrained estimation shows much more persistence in
the high variance regime and less persistence in the low volatility regime than the constrained
estimation.
To sum up, when we relax the assumption of RE, we find an α that is statistically different from
1, implying SBE that load heavily on past SBE. Nevertheless, the parameter estimates, model dy-
namics and regime identification are similar in this model to what they were in the RE equilibrium.
5 Conclusions
In this article, we identified macroeconomic regimes through the lens of a simple New-Keynesian
model accommodating regime switches in macroeconomic shocks and systematic monetary policy.
We demonstrate that monetary policy has witnessed several spells of activist policy, which have
become more frequent post 1980. Nevertheless, we do not see a permanent switch from accom-
modating to activist policy around 1980, but rather occasional switches back and forth between the
two regimes. One reason is that the data suggest an important and time-varying role for discre-
tionary monetary policy. For example, the Volcker period is characterized by both activist system-
atic policy and discretionary active policy. We also document important changes in the variances
of output and volatility shocks. It is no surprise that we find strong evidence of a “shock variabil-
ity moderation” occurring around 1985 for output, whereas for inflation the timing is somewhere
between 1985 and 1990. What is new is that we find strong evidence of this volatility reduction
having ended, for output at the onset of the recent economic crisis (more precisely in 2007), for
inflation, earlier in 2005. The variability of shocks is not the only determinant of macro-variability
however. Our model implies that the effect of monetary policy regimes on macro variability is rel-
atively larger than the effect of the variability of shocks. When we investigate the time path of the
overall variability of inflation and the output gap, we find that the Great Moderation starts around
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1980 and ends in about 2007. During that period, a predominantly active monetary policy and low
variability economic shocks combined to make output and inflation substantially less variable than
unconditional averages would suggest.
Estimating a rational expectations New-Keynesian model with regime switches is difficult from
a numerical perspective. Our innovation was to expand the information set with survey expecta-
tions on inflation and output growth. By formulating a simple law of motion for these expectations
as a function of the true rational expectations, we could greatly simplify the likelihood construc-
tion. Constraining the parameter space to those parameters that yield a stable rational expectations
equilibrium, we find survey expectations to be almost equivalent to rational expectations. However,
when we relax these constraints, we find survey expectations to only gradually adjust to rational
expectations and the parameters to be outside the rational expectations equilibrium space. Fortu-
nately, the identification of regimes remains similar to that obtained in the rational expectations
model, except that the Great Moderation in terms of output volatility ends much earlier (in 2000!)
when identified from the unconstrained model.
There are two possible interpretations to these different estimation results. One possibility is
that agents truly have rational expectations but that our New-Keynesian model is misspecified. Per-
haps, we need a more intricate natural rate of output process or we must add investment equations
as in Smets and Wouters (2007) to better fit the data. We did experiment with slightly more com-
plex specifications (e.g. three monetary policy regimes, state-dependent transition probabilities,
correlated regimes) within the confines of the stylized New-Keynesian model, finding little im-
provement in fit, and no noteworthy new results. Perhaps some of the parameters we now assume
to be time-invariant may also be unstable. For example, a number of recent articles including Be-
nati (2008), Hofmann, Peersman, and Straub (forthcoming), and Liu, Waggoner, and Zha (2011))
have raised the possibility of an unstable AS equation, for instance because the degree of price
and/or wage indexation changes through time.8
8Some preliminary analysis did not reveal any evidence in favor of switches in δ, the parameter governing the
degree of forward looking behavior in the AS equation.
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Table 1: Specification Tests on Model Residuals
This table reports Monte-Carlo p-values for the different specification tests described in Appendix B. For
both the Rational Expectations and Unconstrained Model, the univariate tests test for a zero mean, no
second order autocorrelation, zero skewness, and no excess kurtosis in the standardized residuals of the
output, inflation, and interest rate equations. The bottom panel reports Monte-Carlo p-values for a test of
zero covariances of the factor shocks of one state variable with the factor shocks of the other two state
variables, as well as a joint test that all covariances are equal to zero.
Rational Expectations Model Unconstrained Model
Univariate Tests Output Inflation Short Rate Output Inflation Short Rate
Mean Test
Zero mean 0.560 0.855 0.905 0.377 0.559 0.807
Autocorrelation 0.000 0.930 0.926 0.000 0.119 0.839
Joint 0.000 0.985 0.976 0.000 0.250 0.933
Variance Test
Unit Variance 0.771 0.684 0.907 0.294 0.552 0.743
Autocorrelation 0.057 0.739 0.485 0.907 0.502 0.504
Joint 0.382 0.845 0.451 0.771 0.536 0.208
Test on Higher Moments
Zero Skewness 0.221 0.033 0.281 0.365 0.450 0.433
Zero Excess Kurtosis 0.861 0.251 0.643 0.853 0.480 0.694
Covariance Tests
Covar shocks with other 0.000 0.000 0.090 0.001 0.000 0.038
Joint 0.000 0.000
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Table 2: Parameter Estimates Rational Expectations Model
This table reports the estimation results of the Rational Expectations Model with independent regimes in
respectively the monetary policy parameters β and γ, the volatility of inflation shocks εASt , the volatility of
output shocks εISt , and the volatility of monetary policy shocks εMPt , as outlined in Section 2. The regime-
switching variables are respectively denoted as smpt , spit , s
y
t , and sit . Panel 1 reports the parameters of the
AS and IS equation. Panel 2 reports the monetary policy parameters. Panel 3 shows the regime-switching
volatilies of respectively the inflation shocks (σAS(spit )), the output shocks (σIS(syt )), and the interest rate
shocks (σMP(sit)) (on a quarterly basis). Panel 4 reports the transition probabilities for the four independent
regime-switching variables. Panel 5 reports the alpha parameter. Standard errors are reported between
parentheses. For the regime-switching parameters, we also report p-values for a Wald test of equality
across regimes between square brackets.
1. Output Gap and Inflation Parameters
δ λ µ φ
0.425 0.102 0.675 0.100
(0.065) (0.044) (0.030) -
2. Monetary Policy Parameters
ρ β(smpt = 1) β(smpt = 2) γ(smpt = 1) γ(smpt = 2)
0.834 2.312 0.598 1.187 0.687
(0.022) (0.182) (0.140) (0.414) (0.111)
[0.001] [0.217]
3. Volatilities
σAS(spit = 1) σAS(spit = 2) σIS(s
y
t = 1) σIS(s
y
t = 2) σMP(sit = 1) σMP(sit = 2)
0.334 0.162 0.142 0.072 0.249 0.041
(0.051) (0.044) (0.031) (0.007) (0.021) (0.007)
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
4. Transition Probabilities 5. Alpha
Pmp11 P
mp
22 P
pi
11 P
pi
22 α
0.878 0.957 0.991 0.980 0.986
(0.108) (0.036) (0.012) (0.028) (0.020)
Py11 P
y
22 P(s
i
t) Q(sit)
0.963 0.984 0.893 0.843
(0.047) (0.015) (0.045) (0.057)
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Table 3: Variance Decompositions and Ergodic Distribution for all Regimes
This table reports the ergodic distribution and the variance decomposition results. In the first and sixth
columns, A and P stand for ‘active’ and ‘passive’ monetary policy regimes. H and L stand for ‘high’ and
‘low’ volatility regimes for supply, demand and monetary policy shocks, respectively. The 2nd and 7th
columns show the probability of each regime in the ergodic distribution, which measures the unconditional
probability of each regime combination. The 3rd through 5th, and 8th through 10th columns report the ratio
of the variance of each variable conditional on a regime combination to its total variance, in percent. That
is, all columns add up to 100.
(smpt ,spit , syt ,sit) Pi rpi ry ri (smpt ,spit , syt ,sit) Pi rpi ry ri
(A, H, H, H), 3.23 1.24 1.98 3.17 (P, H, H, H) 9.16 14.24 14.31 12.08
(A, H, H, L) 2.20 0.79 1.23 1.96 (P, H, H, L) 6.24 8.61 6.52 7.51
(A, H, L, H) 7.46 2.86 4.35 7.26 (P, H, L, H) 21.17 32.89 32.18 27.83
(A, H, L, L) 5.09 1.82 2.68 4.50 (P, H, L, L) 14.43 19.88 14.46 17.30
(A, L, H, H) 1.45 0.24 0.50 0.71 (P, L, H, H) 4.12 3.25 4.56 2.86
(A, L, H, L) 0.99 0.14 0.28 0.40 (P, L, H, L) 2.81 1.72 1.65 1.62
(A, L, L, H) 3.36 0.55 1.05 1.62 (P, L, L, H) 9.53 7.49 10.13 6.56
(A, L, L, L) 2.29 0.32 0.59 0.90 (P, L, L, L) 6.49 3.96 3.54 3.72
Table 4: Ratio of Regime-Dependent Variances and Unconditional Variances in each regime
This table shows the ratio of the variance of a given variable (pi: inflation, y: output gap and i: interest
rate) conditional on a given regime to the unconditional variance of that variable implied by the model.
Each regime combines systematic monetary policy (A: active, P: passive) and regime shock size for the
three shocks (H: high, L: low). In the last line, we divide the ratio of the all-high-shock regime by the
all-low-shock regime, for both active and passive monetary policy regimes.
(smpt ,spit , syt ,sit) rpi ry ri (smpt ,spit , syt ,sit) rpi ry ri
(A, H, H, H), 0.38 0.61 0.98 (P, H, H, H) 1.56 1.56 1.32
(A, H, H, L) 0.36 0.56 0.89 (P, H, H, L) 1.38 1.05 1.20
(A, H, L, H) 0.38 0.58 0.97 (P, H, L, H) 1.55 1.52 1.31
(A, H, L, L) 0.36 0.52 0.88 (P, H, L, L) 1.38 1.00 1.20
(A, L, H, H) 0.17 0.34 0.49 (P, L, H, H) 0.79 1.11 0.69
(A, L, H, L) 0.14 0.29 0.40 (P, L, H, L) 0.61 0.59 0.58
(A, L, L, H) 0.16 0.31 0.48 (P, L, L, H) 0.79 1.06 0.69
(A, L, L, L) 0.14 0.26 0.39 (P, L, L, L) 0.61 0.55 0.57
(H,H,H) vs (L,L,L) 2.76 2.39 2.49 (H,H,H) vs (L,L,L) 2.55 2.87 2.30
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Table 5: Ratio of Passive and Active Regime-Dependent Variances
This table shows the ratio between the regime dependent variances conditional on the passive monetary
policy regime and those conditional on the active monetary policy regime, for all variables.
(smpt ,spit , syt ,sit) rpi ry ri
(P, H, H, H)/(A, H, H, H) 4.05 2.55 1.34
(P, H, H, L)/(A, H, H, L) 3.85 1.87 1.35
(P, H, L, H)/(A, H, L, H) 4.05 2.61 1.35
(P, H, L, L)/(A, H, L, L) 3.85 1.90 1.35
(P, L, H, H)/(A, L, H, H) 4.76 3.23 1.41
(P, L, H, L)/(A, L, H, L) 4.38 2.05 1.44
(P, L, L, H)/(A, L, L, H) 4.77 3.41 1.43
(P, L, L, L)/(A, L, L, L) 4.39 2.13 1.45
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Table 7: Estimation Results for Unconstrained Regime-Switching Macro Model
This table reports the estimation results of the unrestricted New-Keynesian Model with independent regimes
in respectively the monetary policy parameters β and γ, the volatility of inflation shocks εASt , the volatility of
output shocks εISt , and the volatility of monetary policy shocks εMPt , as outlined in Section 2. The regime-
switching variables are respectively denoted as smpt , spit , s
y
t , and sit . Panel 1 reports the parameters of the
AS and IS equation. Panel 2 reports the monetary policy parameters. Panel 3 shows the regime-switching
volatilies of respectively the inflation shocks (σAS(spit )), the output shocks (σIS(syt )), and the interest rate
shocks (σMP(sit)) (on a quarterly basis). Panel 4 reports the transition probabilities for the four independent
regime-switching variables. Panel 5 reports the alpha parameter. Standard errors are reported between
parentheses. For the regime-switching parameters, we also report p-values for a Wald test of equality
across regimes between square brackets.
1. Output Gap and Inflation Parameters
δ λ µ φ
0.351 0.076 0.331 0.100
(0.070) (0.031) (0.048) -
2. Monetary Policy Parameters
ρ β(smpt = 1) β(smpt = 2) γ(smpt = 1) γ(smpt = 2)
0.871 2.164 0.210 1.335 0.748
(0.020) (0.250) (0.192) (0.328) (0.138)
3. Volatilities
σAS(spit = 1) σAS(spit = 2) σIS(s
y
t = 1) σIS(s
y
t = 2) σMP(sit = 1) σMP(sit = 2)
0.316 0.137 0.092 0.050 0.253 0.038
(0.034) (0.026) (0.010) (0.023) (0.040) (0.004)
4. Transition Probabilities 5. Alpha
Pmp11 P
mp
22 P
pi
11 P
pi
22 α
0.841 0.936 0.990 0.973 0.410
(0.095) (0.032) (0.011) (0.024) (0.066)
Py11 P
y
22 P
i
11 P
i
22
0.973 0.959 0.891 0.837
(0.080) (0.116) (0.057) (0.061)
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Figure 1: Smoothed Regime Probabilities (Rational Expectations Model)
This figure shows the smoothed probabilities of the regimes in the general regime-switching New-Keynesian
Macro model with four independent regime variables. Panel A shows the smoothed probabilities of respec-
tively the high inflation shock volatility regime and the high output shock volatility regime. Panel B shows
the smoothed probabilities of respectively the active monetary policy regimel, and the high interest rate
shock volatility regime. NBER recessions are shaded gray.
Panel A: High Inflation and Output Volatility Regimes
Panel B: Active Monetary Policy and High Interest Rate Volatility Regimes
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Figure 2: Determinacy and Indeterminacy Regions under Rational Expectations
This figure shows the determinacy/indeterminacy regions of our MS DSGE implied by different values of
the two regime-dependent interest rate responses to expected inflation. The remaining parameters are set at
their estimated values.
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Figure 3: Impulse Responses to AS Shocks
This figure shows the impulse responses of inflation, the output gap and the short-term interest rate to the
AS shock implied by our structural regime switching model. Each panel plots the responses of each variable
dependent on a given monetary policy and shock regime. MP1 (MP2) represents the estimated stabilizing
(accommodating) monetary policy reaction function, whereas σ1 (σ2) is the estimated high (low) shock.
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Figure 4: Impulse Responses to IS Shocks
This figure shows the impulse responses of inflation, the output gap and the short-term interest rate to the
IS shock implied by our structural regime switching model. Each panel plots the responses of each variable
dependent on a given monetary policy and shock regime. MP1 (MP2) represents the estimated stabilizing
(accommodating) monetary policy reaction function, whereas σ1 (σ2) is the estimated high (low) shock.
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Figure 5: Impulse Responses to MP Shocks
This figure shows the impulse responses of inflation, the output gap and the short-term interest rate to the
MP shock implied by our structural regime switching model. Each panel plots the responses of each variable
dependent on a given monetary policy and shock regime. MP1 (MP2) represents the estimated stabilizing
(accommodating) monetary policy reaction function, whereas σ1 (σ2) is the estimated high (low) shock.
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Figure 6: Time-Varying Variances relative to Unconditional Variances
This figure plots the ratio of the time-varying variance, computed using the smoothed regime probabilities
as described in equation (19), to the unconditional variance for the inflation, output gap and interest rate
series.
Figure 7: Contribution of Monetary Policy to the Volatility [
√
V̂ar[Xt |Passive]/
√
V̂ar(Xt)]
This figure plots the volatility ratio between the counterfactual volatility of the three macro variables, con-
ditional on the monetary policy regime always being in the passive regime, and their time-varying volatility
(calculated using the smoothed probabilities).
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Figure 8: Contribution of Monetary Policy to the Volatility [
√
V̂ar(Xt)/
√
V̂ar[Xt |Active]]
This figure plots the volatility ratio between the time-varying volatility (calculated using the smoothed
probabilities) of the three macro variables and their counterfactual volatility, conditional on the monetary
policy regime always being in the active regime.
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Figure 9: Smoothed Regime Probabilities (Unconstrained Model)
This figure shows the smoothed probabilities of the regimes in the unrestricted regime-switching New-
Keynesian Macro model with four independent regime variables. Panel A shows the smoothed probabilities
of respectively the high inflation shock volatility regime and the high output shock volatility regime. Panel
B shows the smoothed probabilities of respectively the active monetary policy regimel, and the high interest
rate shock volatility regime. NBER recessions are shaded gray.
Panel A: High Inflation and Output Volatility Regimes
Panel B: Active Monetary Policy and High Interest Rate Volatility Regimes
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Appendix
A Identifying the Parameter Space of Existence of Fundamen-
tal REEs
We characterize the parameter configuration for which a REE exists numerically through a combi-
nation of grid search and randomized parameter choices. The parameters of the standard deviations
and the transition probabilities do not matter for the existence of the fundamental REE. Hence, it is
sufficient to consider the parameters in the AS, IS and MP equations, plus the transition probabil-
ities of the monetary policy regimes: δ, λ, µ, φ, ρ, β1, β2, γ1, γ2, Pmp11 and Pmp22 with a restriction
β1 > β2 where βi = β(smpt = i), γi = γ(smpt = i) for i = 1,2, and Pmpi j = Pr(smpt+1 = j|smpt = i) for
i, j = 1 and 2. This table describes the parameter ranges we consider:
Parameter Range Parameter Range
δ (0,1] λ (0,∞)
µ (0,1] φ (0,∞)
ρ (0,1)
β1 [1,∞) β2 (0,∞)
γ1 (0,∞) γ2 (0,∞)
Pmp11 (0,1) P
mp
22 (0,1)
Let θ indicate a particular parameter vector and Θ the parameter space specified in the above
table. We decompose Θ into the following disjoint subspaces Θ(E) and Θ(NE). Θ(E) is the space
over which a fundamental REE exists and it has finite first moments, and Θ(NE) = Θ\Θ(E). We
refer to Cho (2011) for further details.9 Let Θ(B(E)) be the outer boundary of Θ(E). So the
ultimate goal is to identify Θ(B(E)).
An initial crude grid search and randomization procedure over the whole parameter space re-
veals that the parameters in Θ(B(E)) are inter-related in a complicated fashion and Θ(B(E)) is
non-convex. Therefore, identifying and characterizing Θ(B(E)), an 11-dimensional contour set,
is a daunting task. Nevertheless, the initial procedure showed that δ, µ, β1 and β2 are the most
critical parameters determining the existence of REEs. Therefore, we decompose Θ into two sub-
spaces Θ1 and Θ2 where θ1 = (δ, µ, β1, β2) ∈Θ1 and θ2 = (λ, φ, ρ,γ1,γ2,Pmp11 ,Pmp22 ) ∈Θ2. Then,
for a given θ2, we grid-search over Θ1 to identify Θ(B(E)). It turns out that such a set is locally
convex in θ1 for a given θ2. Then we vary θ2 to assess whether Θ(B(E)) is altered. Let’s illustrate
9Unlike linear RE models, the forward solution may not have finite second moments even if it has a finite first
moment.
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this procedure with an example:
Step 1: Fix ¯θ2 at (0.05, 0.05, 0.5, 0.1, 0.1, 0.75, 0.5).
Step 2: Choose 10 values for each one of θ1 = (δ, µ, β1, β2). That is, we check the existence
of the forward solution for 10,000 sets of parameters, finding 8,755 sets for which the forward
solution exists. We define the set Θ1(E|¯θ2) = {θ1| The forward solution exists at (θ1, ¯θ2)} and the
boundary of this set is Θ1(B(E)|¯θ2).
Step 3: We change one parameter value in θ2 and follow steps 1 and 2 to see how the set
Θ1(B(E)|¯θ2) changes.
It is not possible to tabulate the set Θ(B(E)) in a systematic way. Instead, we verbally describe
our main findings. First, holding other parameters fixed, combinations of high β1(> 1) and low
β2(< 1) form the boundary, Θ(B(E)). Hence, a REE can exist in a model where monetary policy is
temporarily passive (β2 < 1). Second, Θ(B(E)) is convex (locally) over θ1. Third, combinations of
high δ(> 0.5) and low µ(< 0.5), or vice versa, lie on the boundary. The forward solution does not
exist for alternative private sector values (low δ(< 0.5) and low µ(< 0.5)). Fourth, the parameter
space Θ(B(E)) is convex over Pmp11 and P
mp
22 , but not convex over (λ, φ, ρ,γ1,γ2) in θ2. In particular,
we are able to derive a lower boundary for Pmp11 (that is, parameters higher than the boundary are
always in Θ(E), and an upper boundary for Pmp22 .
In general, it is very difficult to compactly describe the parameter space for which the forward
solution exists. The boundary Θ(B(E)) is not convex over all the parameters and the parameters
are very interrelated. Nevertheless, our experiments here help us restrict the parameter space for
the estimation procedure.
B Data Appendix
Our dataset consists of economic state variables for the US. Our sample period is from the fourth
quarter of 1968 to the second quarter of 2008 for a total of 159 observations. The state variables
are seasonally adjusted and expressed in percentages at a quarterly basis. Below we give details on
the exact data sources used and on the way the series are constructed:
1. Output Gap (y): The output measure is real Gross Domestic Product (GDP), from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis. The gap is computed as the percentage difference between
output and its quadratic trend. The output gap is divided by four to express it at a quarterly
basis.
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2. Expected Output Gap (y f ): The expected output gap is constructed as follows :
Et [yt+1] = Et
[
gt
gt
(
gt+1
trt+1
−1
)]
= gt
Et
[
gt+1
gt
]
trt+1
−1
with
gt = level of real GDP at time t
trt = (quadratic) trend value of real GDP at time t.
We use survey-based expectations of real GDP (level) for the current and next quarter to
measure Et
[
gt+1
gt
]
. The source is the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF).
3. Inflation (pi): Percentage difference in the Gross Domestic Product Chain-type Price Index,
from the U.S. Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis.
4. Expected Inflation (pi f ): Median survey response of expected growth in the GDP deflator
over the next quarter, from the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF).
5. Nominal Risk-free Rate (i): 3-Month Treasury Bill: Secondary Market Rate. The source is
Federal Reserve. The rate is divided by four to express it at a quarterly basis.
The Table below reports summary statistics for the different state variables:
Panel A: Summary Statistics
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis
yt 0.0083 0.0417 1.3360 -1.5094 0.5496 -0.0302 2.9290
y ft -0.0074 0.0748 1.3521 -1.5046 0.5654 -0.0368 2.9736
pit 1.0022 0.7879 3.1137 0.1494 0.6164 1.1872 3.9637
pi
f
t 0.9609 0.8091 2.3212 0.3234 0.5029 1.0852 3.2649
it 1.4657 1.3550 3.7550 0.2200 0.7096 0.8295 4.1004
Panel B: Correlations
yt y
f
t pit pi
f
t it
yt 1.00 0.98 0.18 0.06 0.09
y ft 0.98 1.00 0.14 -0.01 0.01
pit 0.18 0.14 1.00 0.84 0.57
pi
f
t 0.06 -0.01 0.84 1.00 0.77
it 0.09 0.01 0.57 0.77 1.00
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C Specification Tests
The reduced form of the model (see Section 2.4) is given by:
Xt = Ω1(St)X ft−1+Ω2(St)X
f
t +Ω3(St)Xt−1+Γ(St)εt εt ∼ N(0,Σ(St)), (C-1)
with Σ being the regime-dependent diagonal variance-covariance matrix for the shocks contained
in εt . Recall that there are 16 different regimes. Let the smoothed regime probability for regime i,
with a slight abuse of notation, be denoted by Pi,t . That is, Pi,t = P [St = i|It ] . Because regimes are
unobserved, the residuals are essentially unobservable to the econometrician. We therefore use the
econometrician’s best estimate for the residuals given full sample information and the smoothed
probabilities, that is, using equation (15):
¯εt =
S
∑
i=1
(Γ(St = i))−1
[
Xt −Ω1(St)X ft−1−Ω2(St)X ft −Ω3(St)Xt−1
]
Pi,t
We denote the regime-dependent variance covariance matrix for these residual, again with a
slight abuse of notation by Vt , that is:
Vt =
S
∑
i=1
Σ(St = i)Pi,t
We perform our different tests on the standardized residuals zt = V
− 12
t ¯εt . We test for a zero mean
and no second-order correlation by testing whether or not b1,b2, and b3 are zero in:
E [zt ]−b1 = 0 (C-2)
E [(zt −b1)(zt−1−b1)]−b2 = 0 (C-3)
E [(zt −b1)(zt−2−b1)]−b3 = 0 (C-4)
Define zˆt = (zt −b1)2−1. We test for a well-specified variance by testing whether or not b4,b5,and
b6 are equal to zero in:
E [zˆt ]−b4 = 0
E [zˆt zˆt−1]−b5 = 0
E [zˆt zˆt−2]−b6 = 0
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We test for excess skewness and kurtosis by testing whether or not b7 and b8 are equal to zero in:
E
[
(zt −b1)3
]
−b7 = 0 (C-5)
E
[
(zt −b1)4−3
]
−b8 = 0 (C-6)
We estimate b1 to b8 using GMM with a Newey and West (1987) weighting matrix with number
of lags equal to 5. The tests for zero mean, unit variance, zero skewness, and zero excess kurtosis
follow a χ2 (1) distribution, the tests for second order autocorrelation a χ2 (2) distribution. The
joint mean and variance tests follow a χ2 (3) distribution. We also perform a small sample analysis
of the test statistics. For each series, we use the estimated parameters from the model to simulate
a time-series of similar length as our sample. For 500 of such simulated time-series, we calculate
the test statistics, and use the resulting distribution to derive empirical probability values.
To investigate whether our model adequately captures the covariance between the factor shocks,
we test whether the following conditions hold:
E
[
zl,tz j,t
]
= 0, for l, j ∈ {yt ,pit , it} ; l 6= j.
We test for each of the 3 variables whether its shocks have a zero covariance with the two other
shocks. This test follows a χ2 distribution with 2 degrees of freedom. In addition, we report
the joint test for the covariances between all factor shocks which follows a χ2 distribution with
3 degrees of freedom. Our p-values results from a small sample analysis of the test statistics,
analogous to that performed for the univariate tests.
D Impulse Response Analysis
Recall from equation (8) that the forward solution of the REE can be characterized as follows:
Xt = Ω∗(St)Xt−1+Γ∗(St)εt εt ∼ N(0,Σ(St)).
Conditional on time t information including St , the one-step ahead prediction of Xt+1 is given by
EtXt+1 = F(St ,1)Xt where F(St ,1) = E[Ω∗(St+1)|St ]. The k-step ahead prediction of Xt is then,
computed recursively as EtXt+k = F(St ,k)Xt where F(St ,0) = I3 and
F(St ,k) = E[F(St+1,k−1)Ω∗(St+1)|St ],
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for k ≥ 1. The initial value of Xt is given by Γ∗(St)εt . Therefore, the impulse responses of Xt+k to
the initial innovation at time t conditional on St are expressed as:
IR(St ,k) = F(St ,k)Γ∗(St)εt , (D-7)
which is just a function of the current state St . Note that the volatility regimes simply determine
the initial size of a given shock and do not affect the impulse response dynamics. Therefore, the
relevant regime variable in F(St ,k)Γ∗(St) is St = smpt . For instance, in the case of a supply shock
and the initial volatility regime being 1, we can set εt = (σAS(spit = 1) 0 0)′. Therefore, the impulse-
response analysis only needs to consider regime-switching in the monetary policy stance. For each
shock, there are two impulse responses starting from the initial monetary policy regime, depending
on the volatility regime of the shock.
E Computing the Unconditional Variance and its Decomposi-
tion conditional on Regimes
In this appendix, we show how to compute the unconditional and regime-dependent variances
of Xt , implied by the rational expectations solution of the model. For expositional purposes, we
rewrite equation (8) as follows:
Xt = Ω(St)Xt−1+V (St)ut ut ∼ N(0, I3), (E-8)
where V (St) = Γ(St)Σ1/2(St). To compute the variance of Xt , we first define the regime variable St ,
the corresponding transition probability matrix and its ergodic probabilities. Recall that the regime
variable St comprises 4 different regime variables St = (smpt ,spit ,s
y
t ,s
i
t), each potentially taking on 2
states. Thus the variable St has 16 different states, indexed in the following way:
St smpt spit s
y
t s
i
t St s
mp
t s
pi
t s
y
t s
i
t
1 (A H H H) 9 (P H H H)
2 (A H H L) 10 (P H H L)
3 (A H L H) 11 (P H L H)
4 (A H L L) 12 (P H L L)
5 (A L H H) 13 (P L H H)
6 (A L H L) 14 (P L H L)
7 (A L L H) 15 (P L L H)
8 (A L L L) 16 (P L L L)
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where A and P stand for ‘active’ and ‘passive’ monetary policy regimes.; H and L stand for ‘high’
and ‘low’ volatility regimes for supply, demand and monetary policy shocks, respectively.
Because the 4 regime variables are assumed independent, the transition probabilities for St are
easily computed from the underlying transition probabilities for the 4 separate regime probabilities.
Let St = i correspond to (smpt ,spit ,s
y
t ,s
i
t) = (i1, i2, i3, i4) where i1 =A or P, i2, i3, i4 = H or L. The
state St = j is defined analogously. Then, the transition probability of switching from i to j,
Pi j ≡ Pr(St = j|St−1 = i) for i, j = 1, ...,16 is given by Pi j = Pmpi1, j1 ×Ppii2, j2 ×P
y
i3, j3 ×Pii4, j4 . If the
regime-switching model is ergodic, the unconditional probabilities, denoted by Pi = Pr(St = i),
satisfy
S
∑
i=1
Pi jPi = Pj,
S
∑
i=1
Pi = 1
where S = 16 and i, j = 1,2, ...,S.
Now multiply with X ′t on both sides of (E-8) and take expectations conditional on the state
St = i:
E[XtX ′t |St = i] = Ω(St = i)E[Xt−1X ′t−1|St = i]Ω′(St = i)+V (St = i)V ′(St = i) (E-9)
as Xt−1 and ut are independent. Since there is no drift term in our model, E[XtX ′t |St = i] is the
variance of Xt conditional on St = i, Var(Xt |St = i). Following Ang, Bekaert, and Wei (2008),
E[Xt−1X ′t−1|St = i] can be written as:
E[Xt−1X ′t−1|St = i] =
S
∑
j=1
E[Xt−1X ′t−1|St−1 = j]Pr(St−1 = j|St = i)
=
S
∑
j=1
E[Xt−1X ′t−1|St−1 = j]
Pr(St−1 = j)
Pr(St = i)
Pr(St = i|St−1 = j)
=
S
∑
j=1
E[Xt−1X ′t−1|St−1 = j]
Pj
Pi
Pji
Plugging this expression into (E-9), we have
E[XtX ′t |St = i] = Ω(i)
(
S
∑
j=1
E[Xt−1X ′t−1|St−1 = j]
Pj
Pi
Pji
)
Ω′(i)+V (i)V ′(i) (E-10)
where Ω(i) = Ω(St = i) and V (i) =V (St = i).
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In order to obtain a closed form expression for E[XtX ′t |St = i], we define vx and v as follows:
vx =

vec(E[XtX ′t |St = 1])
vec(E[XtX ′t |St = 2])
...
vec(E[XtX ′t |St = 16])
 , v =

vec(V (1)V ′(1))
vec(V (2)V ′(2))
...
vec(V (16)V ′(16))

Then, equation (E-9) for all i = 1, ...,S can be expressed as:
vx = ΣΩvx+ v, (E-11)
where (i, j)-th element of the matrix ΣΩ is given by:
ΣΩi j = [
Pj
Pi
PjiΩ(i)⊗Ω(i)].
Therefore, vx = (In2S−ΣΩ)−1v where n = 3. By reshaping vx back into a matrix form, we have the
formula for E[XtX ′t |St = i] for all i = 1,2, ...,S. Finally, Var(Xt) = E(XtX ′t ) can be obtained as:
Var(Xt) = E(XtX ′t ) = E
(
E[XtX ′t |St ]
)
=
S
∑
i=1
E[XtX ′t |St = i] ·Pi
=
S
∑
i=1
Var[Xt |St = i] ·Pi.
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